Threat Research

Every browser tab runs code the vendor chose to send to it, and everything in that code is visible to whoever opens developer tools, reads a source map, or decompiles the bundle. A recurring and often underestimated class of exposure is what happens when that shipped code, or a config response it calls, carries something… Read More »Shipped to the Browser: How FireCompass’s Agentic AI Penetration Testing Found API Keys and Signing Secrets Hardcoded Into Client-Side Code Across Ten Independent Programs

As organizations continue to expose authentication and account-recovery flows directly to the public internet, these flows remain some of the highest-value, least-forgiving attack surfaces on the web. A single unparameterized query can turn a login form into a full database read primitive. During a recent bug bounty assessment, this finding was surfaced by FireCompass’s Agentic… Read More »How FireCompass AI Agent Discovered a Critical SQL Injection in an Authentication and Password-Reset Flow

Modern web applications often expose numerous server-side components that invoke operating system utilities to process user requests. While these utilities simplify functionality, they also expand the attack surface when user-controlled input is passed into shell commands or embedded scripting engines without proper validation. During a recent private bug bounty engagement, FireCompass AI Agent autonomously identified… Read More »From Discovery to Initial Access: How FireCompass AI Agent Identified Multiple Remote Code Execution Paths

Most stakeholders treat a domain as a security boundary. It is not. The forest is. This walkthrough traces a single attack chain that started with domain-admin access already held in a child domain and ended with every credential in the environment dumped from the forest root. The pivot that made it possible was one forged… Read More »Attack chain walkthrough: Forest root domain compromise via golden ticket with SID history