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Date of Incident:
2024-04
Overview:
In a credential stuffing attack reported in January 2026 but occurring in April 2024, PcComponentes, a retail company, experienced a breach resulting in the exposure of order details, physical addresses, full names, phone numbers, IP addresses, product wishlists, and customer support messages for a small number of accounts. Attackers used previously breached credentials to automate login attempts without compromising financial details or passwords. To address the breach, PcComponentes implemented CAPTCHA, mandatory two-factor authentication (2FA), and invalidated active sessions. The attack was aligned with the MITRE ATT&CK framework (T1110) and involved automated HTTP POST requests exploiting weak or reused passwords.
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Impact:
Exposure of order details, physical addresses, full names, phone numbers, IP addresses, product wishlists, and customer support messages for a small number of compromised accounts due to credential stuffing attack. No financial details or passwords were compromised. Company implemented CAPTCHA, mandatory 2FA, and invalidation of active sessions.
Details:
The PcComponentes breach involved a credential stuffing attack mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1110 (Brute Force). Attackers used lists of breached user credentials from other sources to automate login attempts. Proof-of-concept behavior included automated HTTP POST requests targeting the login endpoints, exploiting weak or reused passwords. Malicious payloads did not involve malware but leveraged valid credentials to bypass authentication. IOCs include IP addresses used for brute force attempts, user agents associated with automation tools, and logs indicating multiple failed login events followed by successful unauthorized access. Relevant logs contain errors such as multiple 401 responses followed by 200 OK responses for the same account. The breach exposed order details, physical addresses, full names, phone numbers, IP addresses, product wishlists, and customer support messages for compromised accounts.
Remediation:
PcComponentes implemented CAPTCHA on login pages to halt automated attempts, mandated two-factor authentication (2FA) for all accounts, and invalidated active sessions post-detection to prevent persistent unauthorized access. Vendor guidance includes keeping authentication mechanisms updated, employing account lockout policies after multiple failed attempts, and monitoring logs for unusual access patterns. Temporary mitigations focus on user education on password hygiene and enforcing multi-factor authentication.
Takeaway for CISO:
This incident underscores the critical need for robust multi-factor authentication and proactive defense against credential stuffing attacks in retail environments. CISOs should prioritize layered defenses including CAPTCHA, 2FA, behavioral analytics, and continuous monitoring to mitigate risks from stolen credentials without clear breaches in the company’s infrastructure.
