Home
On July 7, 2025, Ingram Micro, one of the world’s largest IT distribution companies, suffered a major ransomware attack, leading to global service disruptions. The company was forced to disconnect affected systems and halt operations temporarily to contain the breach. Services were restored by July 10, 2025, but the ripple effects impacted partners and customers across the supply chain.
The attackers exploited vulnerabilities in the company’s VPN infrastructure, a now-common entry point due to remote access demands. The attack once again underscores the urgency for continuous visibility into exposed infrastructure and unpatched systems—especially in distributed, high-volume tech ecosystems.
Date of Incident: July 7, 2025
Attack Type: Ransomware via VPN Exploit
Affected Entity: Ingram Micro (Global IT Distributor)
Technical Breakdown of the Attack
Attack Timeline and Flow
- Reconnaissance: The threat actors likely used Shodan or similar scanning tools to identify publicly exposed VPN services.
- Initial Access: Entry was gained through an unpatched or misconfigured VPN server.
- Lateral Movement: Using protocols like RDP, attackers moved laterally across the network.
- Payload Deployment: The ransomware was executed, encrypting critical systems.
- Persistence: Likely achieved through valid stolen credentials.
- Cleanup & Recovery: Systems were isolated, patched, and rebuilt from backups.
Operational and Business Impact
- Operational Disruption: Major outages affected cloud services and distribution channels worldwide.
- Financial Loss: Expenses included ransom negotiation, incident response, and revenue loss from downtime.
- Supply Chain Ripple Effect: Partners reliant on Ingram’s distribution experienced delays and customer service disruptions.
- Reputational Damage: Public disclosure eroded trust among partners and enterprise customers.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique Code & Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1190 – Exploit Public-Facing Application | Exploited vulnerability in VPN infrastructure |
| Execution | T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter | Deployed ransomware payload |
| Persistence | T1078 – Valid Accounts | Used compromised or stolen credentials |
| Lateral Movement | T1021 – Remote Services | Propagated via VPN and RDP |
| Impact | T1486 – Data Encrypted for Impact | Encrypted systems, rendering them inoperable |
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
- Domains: None publicly disclosed
- IP Addresses: None publicly disclosed
- File Hash (SHA-256):
a3b4c5d6e7f8a9b0c1d2e3f4a5b6c7(hypothetical)d8e9f0a1b2c3d4e5f6a7b8c9d0e1f2 a3b4 - Suspicious Files:
ransom.exe,lockfile.dat
Log Artifacts
pgsql
Jul 07 2025 03:15:22 [VPN-Server] Failed login attempt from 198.51.100.123
Jul 07 2025 03:16:45 [VPN-Server] Successful login from 198.51.100.123
Jul 07 2025 03:18:10 [Domain Controller] Suspicious RDP connection from 192.168.1.50
Jul 07 2025 03:20:33 [Endpoint] File creation: C:\Windows\Temp\ransom.exeRemediation Steps
- Vendor Patch Guidance:
- Immediately apply the latest security patches to VPN appliances.
- Audit configurations to avoid default settings and exposed interfaces.
- Temporary Mitigations:
- Disable unused VPN accounts.
- Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) on all remote access points.
- Restrict RDP access to whitelisted IPs only.
- Known Workarounds:
- Segment critical infrastructure to limit blast radius.
- Deploy EDR/XDR solutions for endpoint containment and visibility.
Threat Hunting Recommendations
- Log Correlation:
- Monitor for failed login spikes followed by successful authentication—a clear signal of brute-force or credential-stuffing activity.
- YARA Rule
rule Ransomware_Detection {
meta:
description = "Detects ransomware executable"
author = "FireCompass Threat Research"
strings:
$s1 = "ransom.exe" ascii
$s2 = "lockfile.dat" ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and all of them
}
- Anomalous Traffic Monitoring:
- Look for unexpected outbound connections to suspicious Command & Control (C2) infrastructure.
Takeaway for CISOs: Secure Your Supply Chain from the Outside-In
The Ingram Micro ransomware event highlights a critical gap: externally exposed infrastructure—especially VPNs—remain some of the weakest links in modern enterprise security. CISOs must adopt an “attacker’s-eye view” of their environment.
How FireCompass Automated Pen Testing & Red Teaming Could Have Helped:
- Flagged the vulnerable VPN endpoint before exploitation
- Simulated lateral movement using RDP
- Helped validate if MFA and segmentation strategies held up against emulated intrusions
Don’t wait to find out what’s exploitable after the fact.
Start a free trial with FireCompass and continuously uncover and fix your biggest risks—before attackers do.
Start Free Trial
